Naval War College Review
Volume 2
Number 2 February

Article 2

1949

The Naval War College
D. B. Beary
U.S. Navy

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Beary, D. B. (1949) "The Naval War College," Naval War College Review: Vol. 2 : No. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Beary: The Naval War College

RESTRICTED

THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
An article by

Vice Admiral D. B. Beary, U. S. N.
A Board recently met in the Navy Department to select a

group of officers of demonstrated ability to attend the next 10-

month course at the Naval War College. This course will start at

Newport, Rhode Island, on August 12, 1949. Here, while free from

the pressure of everyday military duties, the selected officers will

study the art and science of war in its broadest aspects.

Through

the study and solution of military problems they will have the

opportunity to improve their ability to think, to increase their pro

fessional stature, and thus to prepare themselves for the duties and

responsibilities of high command.

Any officer fortunate enough to

be selected for this assignment can look forward to one of the most
interesting and profitable years of his entire career.

Perhaps it is significant that when the Naval War College

was established in 1884 the Industrial Revolution was just hitting

its stride. The full impact of steam, electricity and the internal
combustion engine was only beginning to be felt.

There followed

a swift march of scientific and industrial events that brought with

it the telephone, radio and the fulfillment of Man's long urge to fly.

This coupled with the development of mass armies, powerful navies

of great mobility, great air fleets, and later, atomic energy, has re
sulted in revolutionary changes in the techniques of warfare. The
total effect of all these factors threatens to overwhelm military
thought and cause it to lose pace.

'.{'he military student is tempted

Ad:iniral Beary is President _of the Naval War College. Prior to as
suming his duties at the Naval War College he served as Com
mandant Twelfth Naval District and Commander Western Sea
Frontier. During the war he commanded Service Squadron Six in the
Pacific and the Operational Training Command in the Atlantic.
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to become so preoccupied with the study of technical developments in
weapons that he is in danger of losing his breadth of vision. Under
these circumstances military thinkers may forget that weapons are

merely the implements of war and ignore the continued need for a
profound understanding of the overall strategy of war. They may
overlook the fact that, throughout the remarkable scientific and in
dustrial advance of the past few generations, two factors have re
mained constant-the human mind and the geography of the Globe.

The mind of Man is still the motivating force behind all
weapons, and our preoccupation with atomic energy should not blind
us to this fact. The pattern of future victories and defeats will con
tinue to originate in that imperfect human machine which has fol
lowed much the same pattern of behavior since Man first learned to
fight.·

The second constant, the geography of the Globe, is also most
important. Land is still the habitat of Man, and so long as it re
mains so, the final objectives of war will be land objectives. Nor

have the seas that cover three-fourths of the surface of the Earth

ceased to be an important factor in modern civilization. Sea power
is the instrument with which Man has been able to adapt the broad
sea expanses of the Globe to his own uses. Sea power means ships
ships that carry !=',irplanes, ships that carry projectiles (and, in the
foreseeable future, guided missiles), ships that carry armies and the
logistics necessary to support war; and above all, ships that carry
the great bulk of world trade, the backbone of modern civilization in
peace and fo war.

The decisive weapon of modern sea power is air power. That
decisive combination known as sea-air power is a weapon whose

potentialities have only begun to become apparent. Today no �ec
tion of the Globe, however remote, can be considered insulated from
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the influence of this sea-air weapon. As our technological know
how continues to expand, the ways in which the broad sea areas of
the Globe can be used in peace and in war will inevitably multiply.
Thus in an age when our attention is centered on spectacu. lar scientific advances there is greater need than ever to clarify our
thinking on the fundamentals of war and the problems of command.
The quality of the commander is a decisive factor in the conduct

of war. It is still he, the commander, who must do the planning
for war.
of war.

It is still he who must direct and coordinate the weapons
It is still he upon whose ability will hinge victory or defeat.

The Naval War College has long been dedicated to the task of insur

ing that qualified officers of all services who attend its courses are
given the opportunity to attain the breadth of understanding and
vision so essential to victory in war. While there, our future com
manders are able to study the strategy, tactics and logistics of sea
power and to relate the role of sea power to the broader field of
global warfare.

The Naval War College conducts three courses, the Senior
and Junior courses in Strategy and Tactics and, of equal importance,
the Logistics course. All courses are closely integrated with one

another. The curriculum includes a study of weapons, geography,

international relations, intelligence, communications, all phases of
logistics, and atomic energy. The strategic problems are joint
problems, involving not only all branches of the armed services but
also various other agencies of government.
New developments and new ideas are weighed and discussed
in an atmosphere of complete freedom of thought and speech. No
dogma, doctrine or preconceived formulae with which to achieve vic
tory are taught. Officers of all services are encouraged to express
themselves freely in the numerous critiques and discussion periods
scheduled throughout the course. Differences of opinion and divided
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conclusions are encouraged rather than discouraged.

They are con

sidered stimulating and helpful in our search for solutions to the
pressing and puzzling problems we face today.

Without these hon

est d_ifferences, freely expressed, there would exist a fatal weakness

within our entire :military establishment. No individual or group of

individuals is expected to go along with the popular current of
opinion.

Each is free to reach his own conclusion based on his

own logic and the facts as he has been able to determine them.

Each is required to think for himself and to apply his own reason
ing power to the solution of military problems.

The philosophy of the Naval War College can be summed up

in the simple statement that we must never permit our thinking to
become static.
ideas.

There must be a constant boil and ferment of new

Old ideas and concepts must be subjected to the most care

ful scrutiny.

Newer and better solutions to our problems must

always be sought, and when they are found, there must still be the

dissatisfaction of knowing there are better answers yet to be
found.

The Naval War College is the catalytic agent through which

officers, who possess the energy and the perspective, can achieve

that mental stature so essential to the exercise of high command.

Note: This article is reprinted by permission of the "Army and Navy
Journal."
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